Here, then, is the story about the Haitian black pig. Black pigs, also known as "creole pigs," had always been the staple of the peasant's life in the countryside. Black pigs were basic, necessary, and blessed. A few years before "Baby" Doc left for exile, the US Health Department warned about the dangers of a swine flu epidemic in Haiti. Hundreds of peasants lost their black pigs, their primary means of living. As one Haitian explained: "When we lost our pig, we lost our bank account." The wholesale slaughter turned out to be unnecessary. The peasants I later interviewed told me that they had been promised money or pigs in return. When I arrived in 1986, there were no black pigs left.

What had happened? How would the Haitians be repaid? The United States sent Iowa pink pigs to Haiti. They were called "cochons blancs," white pigs. Not as hardy as the tough creole pigs, they needed expensive feed and special cages out of the sun, since, as one Haitian told me, "they have soft stomachs, delicate feet, and thin skin." These pigs ended up in the various Protestant missions that sprung up in the late eighties. When I visited "Christianville," a mission founded by the First Christian Church, Pastor Herget took me to the pig farm. According to the Evangel, "a Christian Quarterly from the Caribbean" (edited by the Hergets and published by the Christianville Foundation in Orlando, Florida), each farmer, once converted from what the pastor called "witchcraft," will get one white baby sow. "Pigs, pigs, pigs. The pig house is full of them. And pretty soon our big fat mothers will give us lots more pigs. Out in the mountains are many children waiting for their daddies to have pigs, too." But the pigs never could live on the peasants' land. They had to come to the mission to see their pigs. They never again had pigs on their land. As I write, most peasants no longer have their land.
at home schooled white power in its export of democracy abroad. I cite Douglass in full:

Prejudice sets all logic at defiance. It takes no account of reason or consistency. One of the duties of minister in a foreign land is to cultivate good social as well as civil relations with the people and government to which he is sent. Would an American white man, imbued with our national sentiments, be more likely than an American colored man to cultivate such relations? Would his American contempt for the colored race at home fit him to win the respect and good will of colored people abroad? Or would he play the hypocrite and pretend to love Negroes in Haiti when he is known to hate Negroes in the United States—aye, so bitterly that he hates to see them occupy even the comparatively humble position of Consul General to Haiti? Would not the contempt and disgust of Haiti repel such a sham?

CODA: BLACK PIGS

I conclude with a story about pigs. In The Yale Review (Spring 1988), following the departure of “Baby Doc” Duvalier, on 7 February 1986, aboard a United States Air Force C-141 cargo plane, I wrote about how the celebratory rituals of alochouage—a word meaning “uprooting”—were used as cover for the continued attempt to destabilize, isolate, and financially starve the Haitian government. The long-awaited elections in November 1986 that were to replace Namphy’s provisional government had turned into a massacre. The United States never condemned attacks by the police and army. Though the Reagan administration suspended further military aid to Haiti in response to the election bloodbath, the bulk of that aid had already been delivered, and military advisors had spent the last two years training the army in “crowd control.” As one army captain had confessed: “The whole thing could be decided in the countryside. People these days are used to hearing shots over their heads. From now on, we’ve got to shoot them like dogs.” The day after the election-day slaughter, Haitians in New York responded—in words reminiscent of Douglass’s time in Haiti—to what our papers called “random chaos” or “gratuitous violence by ‘gangs of thugs in civilian clothes and soldiers’ with a march down Fifth Avenue. Young and old, shaken but somber, they carried signs that left no uncertainty about their sense of what had happened to their country: “Haitian Bloodbath made in USA”; “Elections Made in USA Are Our Passport to Hell”; “Haiti Is Not For Sale.”

Now, looking back over the last fifteen years, I realize that the continued dispossession I feared would be the result of “operation democracy” in Haiti has come to pass. Andrew Blandford, research associate at the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), has recently authored a press memorandum entitled “As Catastrophe Approaches in Haiti, the US Continues to Block International Loans” (13 June 2002). Less than a decade after the United States pronounced the restoration of democracy in Haiti with the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, accompanied by the Marines, the international community has financially repudiated the nation. Dr. Paul Farmer, a Harvard medical professor, director of Haiti’s celebrated Zanmi Lasante clinic, and author of The Uses of Haiti (1994) and AIDS and Accusation (1992), explained that the “blocked $146 million in IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] loans are for health, water, and education. It’s insane for the richest country in the world to hold up financing of these projects in one of the poorest.”
from the Haitian government to enable him to send a line of steamers between New York and Haiti. Douglass arrived in Haiti unaware of these plans, although the Navy and the State Department would claim that he had been fully briefed. As he put it in his memoirs: "I found myself somewhat in the position of a servant between two masters." Actually, he was caught in a triangle: Harrison had appointed him, Gherardi degraded him, and Clyde insulted him. He remained throughout these difficult months attached to his ministerial duty insofar as he could ensure his government's fair treatment of a fellow republic still "small and weak." Practically supplanted as minister by the US Navy in the attempt to acquire the Mole, he was then attacked as "an unprofitable servant" with a "weakness for Haiti" in his failure to get Clyde his steamship subsidy.

Douglass arrived in Port-au-Prince in early October 1889. Antenor Firmin, Hyppolite's minister of foreign affairs, the idol of the intellectual elite, a black Haitian who was the favorite of the Liberal party (1870–84), worked closely with Douglass. In 1889, Firmin had published De l'égalité des races humaines in Paris, twenty years after Count Arthur de Gobineau's Essai de l'inégalité des races humaines. As anthropology's first scholar of African descent, though little known, Firmin denounced the hierarchy of the human races, declaring: "If the anti-philosophical and pseudo-scientific doctrine of the inequality of the races is based on the exploitation of man by man." By 1891, what became known as the "Gherardi affair" signaled to many Haitians, especially those Douglass described as "the least favored classes," President Hyppolite's desire to "sell the country to Americans." On 25 January 1891, in company with the USS Kearsage and Enterprise, Rear-Admiral Gherardi anchored his flagship USS Philadelphia at Port-au-Prince. Instead of coming ashore and calling upon Douglass, Gherardi hailed Douglass to come on board.

Since Jean-Jacques Dessalines's Constitution of 1805, when he declared that no white, whatever his nation, could set foot on the territory of Haiti as master or owner of property (Article 12), no Haitian president ever granted foreigners the right to own property. Such ownership would be validated years later with the American occupation and the Constitution of 1918. But during Douglass's year of negotiations for the Mole, he realized: "Nothing is more repugnant to the thoughts and feelings of the masses of that country than the alienation of a single road of their territory to a foreign power." Douglass also understood that the form of the negotiation, with Rear-Admiral Gherardi's ultimate tactic of persuasion—a squadron of large ships of war with a hundred cannon and two thousand men—was not guaranteed to ensure success.

On April 22, 1891 Firmin refused Gherardi's request, reporting that the Haitian cabinet felt a lease of the Mole would be "in the eye of the Government of Haiti an outrage on the national sovereignty of the Republic." Since Haitians unfairly condemned Firmin for even beginning negotiations with the United States for a piece of territory, he resigned on May 3 and left for Paris in self-imposed exile. Then, on 30 July 1891, Douglass sent a letter to the State Department, resigning his position in Haiti: "Sir: I have the honor to respectfully render to Honorable Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, my resignation of the office of Minister Resident and Consul General [...] to Haiti [...]"

Douglass never quite recovered from his compromised position as dark-skinned representative of racism and greed. His condemnation of prejudice and inextricable from US policy in his Life and Times demonstrated how entangled had become diplomacy abroad with dispossessions at home, or to put it another way, how exploitation...
accused of revering the President as "a superior being": "The American minister has much more respect for the Haitian Government than for that of the United States" (19 June 1891). Yet, in spite of the condemnations heaped upon Douglass, official papers in the National Archives of the United States confirm Douglass's account, as Rayford Logan has emphasized in "Haiti Thwarts the United States," the final chapter of his superb Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti.

When Douglass went to Haiti, a place condemned in the media as barbarous and degenerate, a contamination of the person by the place occurred. In re-considering his role as "scapegoat," Douglass concluded: "One of the charitable apologies they are pleased to make for my failure is my color; and the implication is that a white man would have succeeded where I failed." By the end of this story, it became difficult to separate what was convinced as the failure of Douglass from the hopelessness of Haiti. Some examples of headlines in the New York Times in 1891 suggest the convergence: "Haiti's Broken Promise," "Haiti Not Grateful," and "The Haitians Do Not Want Black Men for Ministers." "Minister Douglass's Conduct Represented in a Most Unenviable Light—More Bloodshed and Disorder in the Black Republic." Following the reporting about Douglass as an incapable man of color, about the dishonesty of Haiti, the bloody disorder of its government, and the failure of negotiations for the Mole St. Nicolas in the New York Times, we might well conclude that these tales—and their interconnections—laid the ground for the US occupation of Haiti by the Marines (1915–34).

We are dealing here with a move from thoughts of colonization—the getting rid of blacks in the United States—to tactics of colonialism: the "protection" or even "annexation" of what the newspapers called "the neger republic." That his appointment was itself described in some circles as "the getting rid of a muddle-headed black man" should help us fill this historical landscape with facts often ignored. With increasing emphasis on American naval expansion in the late 1880s and the building of the Panama Canal, the United States became convinced of the strategic importance of Haiti. So while the New York Times throughout 1889 reported daily on Haiti’s "relapse toward savagery," a "black mob pretending to be a Government," "savagery, marked by massacre and cannibalism," "a reign of terror," there had been plans at least since 1888 for the ceding of Mole St. Nicolas to the United States, as well as the project to obtain concessions from Haiti.

For Haitians, the years between 1843 and 1888 marked crucial changes in what became a multicolored class aristocracy. The period witnessed the formation of Haiti's first modern, nationwide political parties: the National Party (1864–1888) and the Liberal Party (1870–84). Throughout these years, and after, there were bloody civil wars. Rebel factions received "help" throughout changes in regime from the varied imperial powers who sought commercial profits and bases for their growing navies. Louis Mondestin Florvil Hyppolite from the North had taken the oath of office at Gonâives on 17 October 1889, after his victory over François D. Légitime, who had proclaimed himself President nearly a year before with the support of the French. Hyppolite in the hills of the North was supported by both the United States Navy, under Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, and the New York mercantile world, represented chiefly by William P. Clyde, who owned Clyde’s Constwize and West India Steam Lines. Clyde loaded ten ships with munitions. Gherardi’s North Atlantic Squadron broke Légitime’s blockade, which permitted arms and other supplies to land.

The reward for this assistance was to be Mole St. Nicolas. Clyde, with the help of Secretary of State James Blaine, also pressed for a subsidy of a half million dollars
to a white country of a black representative might execute "a death wound" to "American prejudice," ended up as "official" spokesman for the Black Republic. He was seventy-one. Haiti was in the midst of one of its recurrent revolutions.

Discrimination has always worked in cunning ways. Here was one of the greatest orators, journalists, and statesman, who, at the end of his life, found himself commissioned to justify Haiti to the United States, and finally had to justify himself. Douglass's turn as minister to Haiti revealed the pathos of a former slave turned public servant. How could the black man who had discovered that he needed to "talk like a slave, look like a slave, and act like a slave" in order for a white audience to listen to his story, talk, look, and act as black minister to what his fellow whites called black Haiti? And what about the conventions of stigma that Douglass had finally understood to be legally sustained in the United States?

It turns out that Douglass's years in Haiti and the reports of the US press condemning his performance there remain one of the most powerful, if not painful, reminders of how service could be converted, practically, into servility. And I would suggest that the press knew how to make the most of the conjunction of the most famous African American in the United States with the country most disdained and feared by the United States. The idiom of racial difference consolidated the prejudice against both icons of color, both figures of rebellion: the black ex-slave and the black ex-colony. Haiti had served as necessary backdrop to the crises of blacks in the United States. "General" Nat Turner's 1831 rebellion—in Southampton, some seventy miles from Richmond, Virginia—became more threatening, once it was compared to the "massacres" of Dessalines in Haiti. As Samuel Warner reported in his "Authentic and Impartial Narrative of the Tragical Scene Which Was Witnessed in Southampton County (Virginia) on Monday the 22nd of August": "[i]n one fatal night more than 1000 of the unfortunate white inhabitants of St. Domingo (men, women, and children) were butchered by the Negroes!" Even Harriet Beecher Stowe in Uncle Tom's Cabin gave clout to her mulatto hero George's plan to colonize blacks in Liberia (and not Haiti) by denigrating the "character of the Haytians" as "a worn-out, effeminate one; and, of course, the subject race will be centuries in rising to anything."

To read the attacks on Douglass is to become aware of the relentless efforts of the United States to destabilize Haiti. Rebellions there were sustained by New York speculators who gained from the traffic in munitions. There was, at this time in Haiti's history, a great deal at stake for expansionists in the United States. Not only resources, but a harbor that would be a gateway to the Gulf, a prize in the struggle with European powers for Caribbean domination. In the final three chapters of his Life and Times, Douglass not only defended himself against a press that had not ceased denigrating him (two of the chapters had already appeared in the North American Review in 1891). He also exposed the combined bribes and threats used to dominate a government that they had seriously underestimated.

What might be the reasons for the intensity of this account and the recitals of harm done? What does his self-defense reveal about the continued disenfranchisement of persons of color? Douglass was accused by the American public and press, among other things, of responsibility for the failure to obtain a naval station at the Mole Saint-Nicolas for the United States. "One of the chief faults found with Mr. Douglass," The New York Times (June 9, 1891) reported, "is that he seems to have considered himself a representative of the negro race rather than of the United States." Again in the Times (19 June 1891), in an article titled "Is Hippolyte a Madman?," Douglass is
Writing before the Civil Rights Cases (1883), Douglass felt secure that the “supreme law of the land,” the “Constitution of the United States” would not “be changed or affected by any conjunction of circumstances likely to occur in the immediate or remote future.” He trusted in the citizenship granted in the Fourteenth Amendment. He knew that the nation had an obligation “to protect its citizens where they are, not to transport them where they will not need protection.”

The surrender he so feared, the race hatred and violence that could strike down the “law of the land,” was fully realized in the 1883 Supreme Court decision that declared the 1875 Civil Rights law unconstitutional. The decision returned the greater share of power to individual states rather than the United States. In Douglass’s final years, he composed a narrative of lament for this “national deterioration.” He had realized that, contrary to his earlier hopes, freedom and free institutions would be ensured “by migration rather than by protection, by flight rather than by right, by going into a strange land rather than by staying in one’s own.”

Here, in his account of the purpose of the majority decision, Douglass analyzes how fear of proximity took hold once equality was recognized. A poodle, as Douglass once said, could sit on the lap of a lady, but a black man could not sit beside her.

When a colored man is in the same room or in the same carriage with white people, as a servant, there is no talk of social equality, but if he is there as a man and a gentleman, it is an offense. What make the difference? It is not color, for his color is unchanged. The whole essence of the thing is in its purpose to degrade and stamp out the liberties of the race. It is the old spirit of slavery and nothing else. To say that because a man rides in the same car with another, he is therefore socially equal, is one of the wildest absurdities.

Douglass recognized how rules of law were more effective in ordaining rituals of exclusion than religious belief or social relations. Civil realities created the meaning of social. Now, as he neared the end of his career, he knew that statute and case law remained crucial to lived intimacies in the United States. For law not only created the means of enforcing status and personal identity, but provided the terms for debasement that in turn invited, and justified the atrocities that could perpetuate it. Justice Harlan had argued in his dissent: “The rights which congress, by the act of 1875, endeavored to secure and protect are legal, not social rights.” Douglass, following nearly upon Harlan’s dissent, condemned the effort to stigmatize the Civil Rights Bill as a Social Rights Bill: “Social equality and civil equality rest upon an entirely different basis, and well enough the American people know it; yet in order to inflame a popular prejudice, respectable papers like the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune persist in describing the Civil Rights Bill as a Social Rights Bill.”

When Douglass was appointed by President Benjamin Harrison in 1889 as Minister Resident and Consul General to the Republic of Haiti, it seemed as if Harrison had visited upon him not an honor, but rather an exile that carried a load of symbolic weight. Douglass had, after all, met with President James A. Garfield as late as 1881, pressing the possibility of sending “some colored representatives abroad to other than colored nations.” Douglass knew that the “mere matter of color” summoned denigration, since a physical trait signaled metaphysical truth. Writing about the rituals of stigmatization, he realized that for whites “color has some moral or immoral qualities and especially the latter.” Only eight years later, Douglass would be sent to Haiti. The man who had questioned the semantics of color, who had argued that an appointment
equality with the best when free, but on this broad continent, not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you. "What was the definition of "citizen"? What did it mean to attain the status of "citizen" of a state as well as of the United States? Lincoln recognized the force of the controversy concerning the definition of "citizenship" in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856) and prophesied that civil disabilities could be perpetuated even when "freedom" had been proclaimed. Majority decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873) and, ten years later, the Civil Rights Cases (1883) worked to undo the civil rights laws, as well as the privileges and immunities granted in the Fourteenth Amendment.

After the Emancipation Proclamation, the most awful experiment in colonization occurred with President Lincoln's blessing. The government entrusted the lives of nearly 500 freedmen to the adventurer Bernard Kock, who took them to Ile-a-Vache, leased to him by the Department of the Interior with the consent of the Haitian government. The statistics tell a gruesome story. Only 378 of the 431 freedmen remained. Of the 53 missing, 8 had deserted and 45 had died. Of the remainder, 31 were sick; 4 of them later died. For six weeks, Kock's company had provided them no place to live, no rations, but instead handcuffs, chains, and wooden stocks were plentiful. Though there was continued talk of emigration, the government of the United States never again sponsored such endeavors. On 2 July 1864, Congress legislated an act to prohibit the use of funds for the colonization of free blacks.

DOUGLASS IN HAITI

Frederick Douglass had long opposed the emigration of blacks from their homes, whether from the South to the North of the United States, or to Haiti, or to any other place promised as free of prejudice. In his Life and Times, writing about the plans of southern blacks to go North, he explained how the very need to move was an affront to the meaning of emancipation and a surrender to prejudice. He called that exodus an "ill-advised and ill-arranged stampede." In his interview with President Andrew Johnson (7 Feb. 1866), he had responded to Johnson's vision of colonization: "Besides, the worst enemy of the nation could not cast upon its fair name a greater infamy than to admit that negroes could be tolerated among them in a state of the most degrading slavery and oppression, and must be cast away, driven into exile, for no other cause than having been freed from their chains." In "The South Knows Us," delivered in Baltimore, Maryland, on 4 May 1879, Douglass responded to the continued calls for emigration:

I have been asked if I am in favor of my people leaving the South and going North. I should be glad to relieve their distress, but I don't believe in their leaving their homes. I think there has been more harm done our business and enterprise by schemes of emigration than from any other cause. Fifty years ago it was to Hayti, a new land of Canaan, where grapes were large, and bananas larger, and those who went were glad to get back. Then came along another paradise for the negro—Jamaica—he was asked to emancipate and go, and many of them actually sold their homes and made their way to the promised land. What became of them? Most of them died from starvation. That was 35 years ago. During the war there was a cry in Washington for the colored population to go to Nicaragua. It would have been a Nigger-ague.
Convention in 1856, he began to advocate African American emigration to Haiti. In *Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for Self Government and Civilized Progress*, published in 1857, he described Haiti as a place that promised “far more security for the personal liberty and general welfare of the governed [... ] than exists in this bastard democracy.”

In 1860, President Fabre Nicolas Gessard continued plans for emigration and appointed the militant journalist and abolitionist James Redpath as “general agent of emigration to Hayti” from the states and provinces of North America. Redpath offered free passage to St. Marce and support until the emigrants were settled on allotments in the public domain, which were to become theirs in fee simple when they had become naturalized (after one year) and had raised a crop. In praise of this “free passage, a welcome, a home and a free homestead,” the *New York Times* (March 1861) called for northern blacks to emigrate, while looking forward to the demise of the South: “Nothing more is required but further installments of the race-element which the North can so well spare, to make Hayti a dangerous rival of the Cotton Confederacy in the markets to Manchester.”

Redpath edited *A Guide to Hayti* (1860), which contains chapters on history, on vacant lands, on the nature of the Haitian people, on emigration laws, on diseases of Haiti and their remedies, and on seaports of Haiti. In the final chapter, “How to Go and What to Take,” Redpath explained that northern emigrants will leave from Boston and southern from New Orleans. Those from New Orleans must pay all the expenses of their passage, he wrote, “as it is not possible, for the moment, to make satisfactory arrangements with vessels from that part of the country.” The most detailed section is about clothing: “[T]ake as many summer suits as you can afford to buy. [... ] Light-colored linen or cotton clothing is the best. [... ] Those who design to cultivate coffee, and will, therefore, live in the high lands, will need woolen clothing and blankets. [... ] Every one should wear flannel undershirts always.” The shortest paragraph is about books: “Take all your books with you; for English books can seldom be had either for love or money.”

Holly had meanwhile organized the “New Haven Pioneer Company of Haytian Emigrants.” By November 1861, about 140 recruits moved to Haiti. One black colonist wrote his wife, with a message that might well have been misunderstood: “I am a man in Hayti where I feel as I never felt before, entirely free.” But for others, that first year was disastrous. Though Holly remained in Haiti to become its first Episcopal bishop (1874), his colonizing venture failed due to floods, disease, and most of all, because of desertions. According to the *New York Times* (March 1862), forty-three emigrants died within six months, including Holly’s mother, his wife, and two of his children. Accounts recall the unfriendliness, even cruelty of Haitian peasants who distrusted and resented English-speaking blacks. Others describe Haitians as helpful, generous, and welcoming. According to some reports, though more than 2,000 emigrants had reached Haiti by January 1862, a year before Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, only 200 remained. In *Remarks on Hayti and the Mulatto* Hunt recalled that in “the seventeen years that I have been resident in, or conversant with Hayti [... ] only thirteen Americans of African blood, who have been what might be called ‘successful’ in that country, and several of this number were only moderately so.”

Lincoln addressed a “Committee of Colored Men” in Washington, DC, on 14 August 1862: “But even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race. The aspiration of men is to enjoy
No more tote the hod,
Not with nail and sticklee,
Nasty, dirty rag
Out of gutter sticklee.

Though they thought they had left scavenging behind in leaving Philadelphia, they ended up rag-picking throughout Haiti. Once the rags were shipped from Port-au-
Prince and Cap Haitien to places that remained unnamed, Hunt concluded, "[A]nd the packing is mostly done by aged Philadelphians who have resumed their old trade."

The Haitian historian Beauchrun Ardouin, friend and partisan of President Boyer and author of the magisterial Études sur l'Histoire d'Haiti (1852–60) described the failed ideal of Haiti as a new Canaan of color. When American ships arrived in Haitian ports, Ardouin observed what happened once Boyer’s plan became a reality. The ships were "loaded with emigrants, men, women, children, the aged, and their miserable effects that they did not want to abandon in leaving the United States. Nothing was sadler than to see their old chests, their old trunks, their wool rags, necessary for the climate of their native land, but useless for that of Haiti." They missed the United States. They were disoriented by a population whose language they did not understand. And even though they shared the same color (Ardouin implies they were noir, not clair), their fellow Haitians "received them with a mocking smile, urged on by their pitiful garb." Most of the arrivals were barbers, shoemakers, and carpenters. When they were given land to cultivate, they returned to the United States, where "they were used to living [...] in the moral degradation that colonial prejudice inflicted on them." For they preferred habitual racism to a new language and the "different rituals of Catholicism."

Ardouin concluded by transforming a tale of woe caused by alien contamination into a new gothic legacy. In 1793, Haitian refugees from the Revolution were accused of transporting to the United States yellow fever, also called "mail de Siem." The gruesome surrender of a city to the horrors of yellow fever in Philadelphia, when nearly 2,500 people died in the summer of 1793, inspired Charles Brocken Brown’s Arthur Mervyn, or Memoirs of the Year 1793. Ardouin shifted the blame for pestilence from the Haitians, both masters and slaves, who had fled to the United States, to the recent emigrants to Haiti who brought smallpox with them. He coolly wrote, in concluding his account of Boyer’s failed project, "One could say that this operation made more Haitians perish by plague than it introduced useful emigrants to Haiti."

After the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law (1850) and the Dred Scott decision (1856), there was renewed interest in emigration to Haiti. Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney described "the free negro or mulatto and the slave" as "that class of persons, who could never be entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities granted citizens of the United States. As he explained, "this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race." Much later, René Depestre in Bonjour et Adieu à la Négritude (1980) identified the stigma of skin that could be translated into the racial substance of inferiority as "somatic semiology." To move to Haiti, then, became a way for some to conceive a way out of permanent legal incapacity.
case discrimination be extended to the emigrants in his instructions brought to New York by Jonathan Granville, "the citizen Granville," Boyer's agent in the United States? These instructions (composed as if a Code of Law with 19 articles) followed the gift of "fifty thousand weight of coffee," the proceeds of which, once sold, would "facilitate the emigration of such individuals of the African race [. . .] disposed to come to Haiti and partake with our citizens the benefits of a liberal constitution, and a paternal government."

Let us look more closely at the articles in Granville's letter of instruction. It stresses both the power of the Haitian state and the advantages of emigration to Haiti: "[A]ll individuals of African blood, who will appear in the Republic, shall, after a years residence, enjoy the civil and political rights and quality of a citizen" (Article IV), "all civil and political rights; entire liberty of conscience, in their religious practices"; "concession of land in fee simple, when they shall have made settlements on the said lands" (Article V).

What about the land? Can we learn anything more about Boyer's plans for those who chose agriculture? Not surprisingly, in this lengthy letter of instruction, Boyer recognized that some will be interested in commercial or mechanical pursuits, since the law recognizes, the right of every Haitian to choose his labor, "provided he does nothing contrary to the good order of society" (Article IX). But for those who prefer "the culture of the earth," they can rent lands already improved, or work in the field, sharing the produce with the proprietor. As soon as the emigrant sets foot on Haitian soil, they must legally make the choice of renter or field-hand, "before the judges of the peace, so that on their arrival here, they will be obliged to apply themselves to agriculture, and not be liable to become vagrants" (Article VII). The Haitian government would give them means of subsistence for four months while they settled on the land. After that, they would "procure by their labour and settlement, the means of supporting themselves" (Article VIII).

During Boyer's regime, the "vagrant" or "idler" was arrested. Only when he consented legally to bind himself to field labor, would he be released from detention. Should he still refuse to bind himself, he was condemned to hard labor in the public works (Code Rural, Article 177). These laborers were called "scavengers." In Haiti at this time, the term suggested something akin to what we now mean by "a dog returning to his vomit." What happened to those described as "Amerindians of African blood" who arrived in Haiti after lengthy financial transactions between Boyer and the agents of colonization in the United States? According to Benjamin S. Hunt in Remarks on Haiti as a Place of Settlement for Afric-Americans, and on The Mulatto as a Race for the Tropics (1850): "Of all Boyer's thirteen thousand American immigrants of 1824-1827, I never found nor heard on one who, after 1836, was living on the land assigned him by government on his arrival. A considerable number of these immigrants, and probably some of the best of them, and those who had means, returned to the United States." Those who were poor and ignorant remained.

One of the stories that has long haunted me is that of the Philadelphia ragpickers, who sang a song of departure cited by Hunt:

Brothers, let us leave
For Port-au-Prince in Hayti,
There we'll be receive
Great as La Fayette.
forced his consent to be bound to whoever was willing to engage him. The worker, whenever no longer useful to his employer, could be discharged without any means of support. He had no claim upon the provision-grounds allotted to him, which he might have cultivated for most of his life. The Code contained 202 articles, aimed primarily at identifying and constraining those "bound" to the soil. Article 3, for example, prescribed cultivation for the civilly dead:

It being the duty of every Citizen to aid in sustaining the State, either by his active services, or by his industry, those who are not employed in the civil service, or called upon for the military service; those who do not exercise a licensed profession; those who are not working artisans, or employed as servants; those who are not employed in selling timber for exportation; in fine, those who cannot justify their means of existence, shall cultivate the soil.

The mass of the population, thus confined to cultivation, were prohibited from entering the towns and villages. Compelled to remain in the section in which they were born, they were forced to build houses or huts in the plantations of their employers. Commanded by overseers and drivers, they were subject to the payment of all taxes. Labor began at daybreak and continued until sunset, with breaks for a half-hour breakfast and two-hour dinner.

Boyer's invitation to Loring D. Dewey, General Agent of the Society for African Colonization in New York must be seen against this codification of servitude. Two years before the signing into law of his Code Rural, Boyer wrote Dewey (30 Apr. 1824), in answer to his inquiry concerning the settlement in Haiti of those he calls "my unhappy coloured countrymen," where they could become citizens of the Republic. Boyer first expressed his gratitude and then promised to "consecrate our cares to moderate the lot of a portion of the human race" by offering Haiti as "an asylum where their existence would be supportable."

As early as December 1823, Boyer had given land to those who wished to cultivate it. He presented a circular to officers of the oulting districts, authorizing "emigrants of color to Hayti" to cultivate "in the mountains or valleys" for "their own profit." These cultivators had no title to the land, but after "payment of the taxes established by the authority of the place," lands "shall be ceded in fee simple, to those who open them and enhance their value." How would those Haitian cultivators bound to the soil feel about those Boyer called "fellow Africans" being given state lands in fee simple? How would those Haitians, whose ancestors fought in the revolution, but who found themselves still working for a master on land not their own, welcome those emigrants who had the rights to own and dispose of an estate in land? This feudal gift of land, absolutely and without end or limit, ordered December 24, 1823 was not "to change," Boyer warned. "that prescribed by my circular of 2d December, 1822, in favour of the persons, who, anterior to the first of last January, should be established without title upon the state lands."

The history of land law is complex, and I cannot here go into the way service and bondage shared complex rituals of domination. Suffice it to say that our current understanding of sharecropping in the New South resembled Boyer's regulation of the property relation between farmers and proprietors. In welcoming these already free blacks from the United States to Haiti, Boyer would have understood that he could not greet them by turning them into slaves of his State, those he called in his Code Rural "Cultivateurs, travailleurs au quart." Did he intend that servility and
the United States. What would happen if people of color from the United States joined with Haitians? Were the generous funds for emigration supplied by the Haitian government a ploy to induce recognition of Haiti's sovereignty by the United States? Lincoln finally recognized Haiti in 1862, after the South seceded from the Union.

Whether part of or foreign to the hemispheric compact of the United States, whether receptacle for blacks or breeding ground for migrants, refugees, or contaminants, an emblematic Haiti forced imagination high and low. Whereas Jules Michelet called the republic "Black France," Thomas Carlyle cursed it as "a tropical dog-kernel and pestiferous jungle." From the 1820s to the 1860s, Haiti became the place of choice for colonizing the descendants of Africans in the United States. That the Haitian president who first succeeded in the passage of free blacks from the United States to the soil of Haiti (which then included what is now the Dominican Republic) was none other than Boyer remains one of those ironies that result from racism cloaked in benevolence. That the president who instituted a Haitian Code Rural as oppressive as, and some argued at the time, more oppressive than the laws regulating slavery in Saint-Domingue would be the same president to offer the soil of Haiti to those "groaning in the United States, under the weight of prejudice and misery" (25 May 1824) should not remain one of the "silences" of history.

Boyer ordained the onerous financial settlement with France in 1825, with conditions that led to decades of French domination of Haiti and jeopardized the fragile economy. One hundred and fifty francs indemnity were to be paid in five years to the dispossessed French planters of Saint-Domingue in order to obtain recognition of the independence of its former colony. The royal edict of Charles X, which conditionally recognized the Republic of Haiti as a "Free, independent, and sovereign state," was backed up my force, leaving no doubt that the reward of sovereignty would be subject to qualification. France conveyed its recognition to President Boyer by a fleet of fourteen warships bearing 494 guns.

But it was Boyer's Rural Code of Haiti (signed at the National Palace in Port-au-Prince on 6 May 1826) that most contributed to the legacy of militarism and compulsory labor that would continue to undermine Haitian democracy. This code of laws, which figured containment as fundamental to the order of society, reduced most Haitians, especially those who did not occupy positions of rank in the military or civil branches of the state, to essentially slave status. A small fraction of Haiti's population lived off the majority, collecting fees with the help of the rural chefs de section—for the sale, travel, and butchering of animals, and even for the cutting of trees. Jonathan Brown, an American physician from New Hampshire who spent a year in Haiti (1833–34), recalled Boyer's regime in The History and Present Condition of St. Domingo (1837): "The existing government of Hayti is a sort of republican monarchy sustained by the bayonet." In Les constitutions d'Haiti (1886), addressed to a Haitian audience, Louis-Joseph Janvier described the code as "slavery without the whip."

Boyer's rural code not only adopted the terminology of punishment and jurisdiction from Jamaica's slave code but looked forward to the invention of "criminally" in the southern United States in the guise of apprentice, vagrant, and contract regulations that ushered in the "forced labor" of "convict lease." Borrowing also from the Code Henry (that of Henri Christophe in 1812), Boyer reinstated strict regulations regarding discipline and schedules of work. Boyer's legal code declared agriculture to be the foundation of national prosperity (Article 1). Other clauses restrained the laborer from leaving the specific part of the country to which he was assigned and
however, no asylum could be named. But with Haitian independence, Jefferson chose Haiti as the “receptacle for that race of men.” Making no distinction between blacks and mulattos, he advised that Haiti has “a population of that color only,” adding that President Petion of Haiti had offered “to pay their passage, to receive them as free citizens, and to provide them employment.” Jefferson admitted that the “separation of infants from their mothers would produce some scruples of humanity,” but, he concluded, “this would be straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel.”

After Alexandre Petion died, Major General Jean-Pierre Boyer was elected “president for life” on 30 March 1818. In February 1823, President James Monroe refused to recognize Haiti. A few months later he drafted the Monroe Doctrine. As Rayford W. Logan has noted in The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776–1891 (1941): “Although the American press commented at length upon the Monroe Doctrine, it made only scant references to its applicability to Haiti.” Not only had Haiti remained, since its independence, unrecognized as a republic, but the United States blocked Haiti’s invitation to the Western Hemisphere Panama Conference of 1825. The relations of the United States with Haiti led Aimé Césaire years later in his Discourse on Colonialism (1955) to warn against “American domination—the only domination from which one never recovers. I mean from which one never recovers unscared.”

A novel rhetoric of colonization had begun. These plans for the evacuation of African Americans were seen alternately as part of the imperial civilizing mission of the United States or as an example of Haitian largesse. Fears of slave uprisings and thoughts of emancipation had ushered in unprecedented theories of evacuation. It was as if once a group of blacks in Haiti rose up against their oppressors to make themselves a nation, that nation became the container for those blacks here, who, even if freed, would never be recognized as citizens. In 1819, Liberia had been founded on the West Coast of Africa by the American Colonization Society for those referred to in one southern court case as “niggers, cattle, or any other thing.”

By the 1820s, although the American Colonization Society refused to cooperate, plans for colonizing free Negroes to Haiti died with the removal to Liberia. Societies such as the “Hayti Emigration Society” in Baltimore and the “Society for African Colonization” in New York published reports of what became known as “the removal of the colored population.” Numerous papers, including the Genius of Universal Emancipation (Baltimore, 1824–25) and The Circular (Delaware, 1824), gave information on ships such as the De Witt Clinton, sailing from New York for Hayti “with her full complement of a hundred and twenty emigrants” (Christian Secretary, September 1824); the ship Concordia out of New York, “with a full complement, about 160 colored emigrants, male & female” (The Circular, October 1824); or the “elegant ship Armata” out of Baltimore, with two hundred and eighty emigrants (Genius of Universal Emancipation, November 1824).

Free African Americans were not exactly chattel, but they remained moveable. After Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, this transformation required an even more ambiguous interplay of property and personhood. For degradation, an externally imposed stigma, remained intact once translated into legal status. It is difficult now to appreciate how newsworthy were these schemes of emigration, argued for and against in numerous papers, replete with letters from both pleased and devastated emigrants, depending on whether or not the article favored emigration as a solution to the “negro problem” or condemned it as a Haitian tactic to compete with, and ultimately destroy
Haitian stampede.” North American human rights advocates joined Haitians in deploving the detention as illegal and inhumane, arguing that “migration” resulted from “political economy” and the “terror” caused by the military coup that overthrew Aristide, Haiti’s first democratically elected President. At that time, the AIDS hysteria with Haitians as focus intensified. A New York Times editorial titled “Blood Stigma, Blood Risk” invoked the threat that one-tenth of one percent of “tainted” blood donations could “evoke detection” and concluded: “Preventing discrimination is a high priority. Keeping the blood supply free of a deadly disease and ensuring adequate supplies rank even higher.”

The forced repatriations of 1991–92, the arguments heard by the Supreme Court in March 1993 concerning Haitians placed in custody at Guantanamo for processing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (and the forced removals in 1994, just months before the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti) were not the first nor would they be the last interdictions of Haitian refugees by the United States Coast Guard.

After 11 September 2002, the current Bush administration announced their decision to subject all non-Cuban asylum seekers arriving in the United States by sea to mandatory detention and expedited removal proceedings. On 29 October, 230 Haitian refugees, arriving off the shores of Miami, were quickly detained by the Miami police and INS officials as they scrambled overboard and tried to make it safely to land. As Dina Paul Parks, the Executive Director of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), explained continued US injustice against Haiti: “Unfortunately, history has repeatedly shown how Haitians remain the only ethnic group who continue to be treated unlawfully once in the hands of US authorities.”

These rituals of exclusion, in what recently has been proclaimed as “eternal war,” have been extended to ever larger groups of persons. Against the backdrop of war without end, all kinds of newly identified “aliens” are detained beyond reach of the law. In April 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft ruled that any illegal immigrant who has not threatened national security but fits into “a security threat category” can be indefinitely detained rather than released on bond. In this bizarre logic, to seek asylum is to commit a crime. David Joseph, one of the hundreds of Haitians who sought asylum, had won the right to be released on bail while he awaited a decision on his claim. Overruling an appellate panel of immigration judges, Ashcroft, under sign of the Department of Homeland Security, argued that even though Joseph posed no security threat, his individual qualities or circumstances no longer mattered. He had become the first sacrifice to what Ashcroft invoked as the threat of “unlawful and dangerous mass migrations by sea.”

THE EMIGRANTS TO HAITI

Thinking about possible emancipation of the slaves in 1824, Thomas Jefferson wrote to Jared Sparks, explaining how best “people of color” could be colonized at least cost to their owners. How, he wondered, could “the getting rid of them” be cheaply done when the owners must be paid for their property? Where might “that race” be sent so that our nation remain pure, with no “blot or mixture on that surface”? His solution: Take newborns and leave them with their mothers “until a proper age for deportation.” Forty-five years before, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson had already projected the great savings to be had in deporting these children. At that time,
Too comforting to claim that the facts of degradation no longer exist. The call for celebration and its burden of remembrance carry with it the anticipation of progress, the evolution of something called “decent.” In reconsidering Haiti’s “past” in our present cult of terror, I turn to a few stories that overlap with an ongoing narrative of stigma. Disabilities are made indelible through time. Old rhetorical strategies initiate new forms of containment. Can we track this historical residue? What are its terms for exclusion? Which words act as revenants, certifying that the image of a servile body can be perpetually reinvented?

As I prepared to write this essay, I came across notes I had jotted down ten years ago:

in order to understand Bush’s unprecedented moves to keep Haitians from entering the US, to know how the American Red Cross could, for the first time in its history, declare a race unfit for blood donation, we have only to see how whites in antebellum America wanted to expel blacks from the states— if freed.

In November 1991, approximately 310 Haitian men, women, and children were imprisoned on the grounds of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. They were fenced in by barbed wire and guarded by Marines armed with automatic machine guns. Living in tin-roofed huts, using rarely cleaned portable toilets. Surrounded by vermin and rats, they were subject to disciplinary action and pre-dawn raids of their sleeping quarters. For over a year and a half, from 1991 to 1993, following the charge of George Bush, Sr., the United States government put into use Camp Bulkeley. Haitian men, women, and children were prisoners in the world’s first and only detention camp for refugees with HIV. Judge Johnson’s opinion in Haitian Centers Council v. Sale (1993) described the conditions at the camp:

They live in camps surrounded by razor barbed wire. They tie plastic garbage bags to the sides of the building to keep the rain out. They sleep on cots and hang sheets to create some semblance of privacy. They are guarded by the military and are not permitted to leave the camp, except under military escort. The Haitian detainees have been subjected to predawn military sweeps as they sleep by as many as 400 soldiers dressed in full riot gear. They are confined like prisoners and are subject to detention in the brig without a hearing for camp rule infractions.

The language of removal and containment had been rehearsed, staged, and refined ever since 1 January 1804, when Jean-Jacques Dessalines proclaimed the independence of the former French Colony of Saint-Domingue. He called the new nation “Haiti,” from the original Amerindian word (Ayiti) for the island meaning “mountainous lands.” As the first Black Republic in the New World, Haiti would become the outcast of the international community, jeopardized by the racism and greed of the developing imperial powers. In Paris as early as 1802, while Napoleon consolidated his plans for remstituting slavery in Haiti, Baudry Deslizes, in Les égarements du négraphilisme (The aberrations of negrophilism), warned that whites were not only threatened with moral deoration when they “misallied” with blacks but risked transmitting not only darkened skin but black blood “that would attack the very heart of France.”

The idea of blood as sign of an ineradicable taint became useful during the forced repatriations of Haitians described as “boat people,” “the new migrants, the
A Few Stories about Haiti, or, Stigma Revisited

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ABSTRACT

In revisiting the history of Haiti, this essay demonstrates the powerful presence of this site as both a source of pride and denigration. Taking Frederick Douglass's arrival as minister resident and consul general to the Haitian government of Louis Florestal Hyppolite in 1889 as focus, the analysis deals with the attempted acquisition of the Molé St. Nicholas by the United States, and Douglass's memorial in the final chapters of his Life and Times (1892) to citizens of the United States, described as "sharks, pirates and Shylocks, greedy for money, no matter at what cost of life and misery to mankind." As Douglass understood, "the badge of servitude" remained too powerful an apparatus to lose its terms underwent—and still sustain—the network of images that perpetuate such antinomies as civility and brutality, ability and deficiency: the rules for a modern concept of servility.

What indeed is the negro but an intensified Creole?
— C. G. Leland. "What to do with Canadians?"
Continental Monthly, 1862

The situation of Haiti gives fresh point to the old saying that no people fit for freedom can be enslaved.
— New York Times, 1889

I recognize again the force of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's argument in Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (1995): "The Past—or, more accurately, pastness—is a position. Thus, in no way can we identify the past as past." It is too easy to accommodate ourselves to what Trouillot calls the "silences" of history.